AI incident response security boundaries

Availability: available

The Harness separates untrusted task/model data from trusted operator composition. Extensibility does not let an event or model expand its own authority.

  • Composition selects the Profile, exact versions, completion evaluator, policy, model binding, tool definitions, executor bindings, and credential sources.
  • Event payload and context provide task input. They cannot install code, replace policy, select arbitrary credentials/endpoints, or change a trusted tool effect.
  • Model output is proposal data. Tool names, versions, and arguments must match the trusted registry and closed schema.
  • Policy runs for advertisement and again for dispatch. A capability disappearing or becoming denied before dispatch does not execute.
  • Invocation intent persists before an external effect. Raw arguments are represented by a digest in invocation audit.
  • Budgets, cancellation, persistence, and artifact provenance remain active even under explicit AllowAllPolicy.

AllowAllPolicy means all trusted registered capabilities are eligible. It is not an authentication bypass and does not create tools that were not composed. RestrictionPolicy is a provided implementation; operators can supply another Policy without changing Runner sequencing.

Profiles can create only model-authored artifacts. Trusted executors create observed or verified artifacts. Verification must identify its subject and report an explicit status. This prevents a generated summary from claiming that a branch, pipeline, deployment, or other external effect was observed and verified.

Unknown write outcomes stop in waiting and are not automatically retried. Exactly-once execution is not implied by an idempotency key or by the core interface.

Core contracts carry opaque model binding identities and tool definitions, not secret loaders. Concrete adapters and composition resolve credentials, validate transports, bound I/O, and redact diagnostics. The Local source preview supplies credentials through explicitly named environment variables and isolates stdio MCP environment. These boundaries are validated for source evaluation, not a supported release package.

The existing incident service has additional application security controls: PostgreSQL business records, Redis login sessions, bcrypt passwords, encrypted project credentials, signed webhook tokens, bounded evidence adapters, and human review. Those controls are scoped to the incident application; application login is not a core Harness requirement.

Optional OpenAI-compatible incident analysis uses project configuration and bounded adapters. Provider content cannot become credential, URL, shell, evidence, merge, deployment, or recovery authority. The current incident workflow keeps merge, deployment, rollback, and production recovery decisions with people.